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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

MICROBIOLOGICAL RESEARCH
CORPORATION, a Delaware
corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
No. 16643

vs.
NADF.EM M. MUNA,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff and respondent, Microbiological Research
Corporation, commenced an action in

Septe~~er

of 1978 seeking

to restrain defendant and appellant from competing with it
in the manufacture and sale of diagnostic test kits, from
using respondent's alleged trade secrets and from soliciting
respondent's customers.
DISPOSITION BY THE SECOND JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT
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The Honorable J. Duffy Palmer entered an Order
awarding respondent an injunction on the 19th day of
November, 1979.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant respectfully requests that the injunction
awarded to respondent by the Second Judicial District Court
be set aside.
FACTS
Appellant, Nadeem M. Muna, received his Bachelor's
Degree in Chemistry in 1951, a Master's Degree in 1954 in
Biochemistry and Microbiology, and in 1968 was awarded his
Ph.D. in Immunology and Microbiology (T. 129).

From 1956 until

1968, while at U.C.L.A. and the Thomas Dee Hospital in Ogden,
Utah, he worked with the imrnunofluorescence technique of
tracing diseases (T. 199).

In 1966 appellant published a

paper in the American Journal of Clinical Pathology describing
a procedure he, along with two other scientists, had
developed to test patients for lupus erythematosis.

The

paper lists the equipment required as well as a step by step
procedure for using imrnunofluorescence to perform an antinuclear antibody test (ANA)
21).

(T. 199 and Plaintiff's Exhibit

FL, HeLa and kidney cells were used by the appellant

in making the slides for the test and these slides could be
stored indefinitely until needed (Plaintiff's Exhibit 21 at
118).

Appellant had good results from these slides five
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years after they were made (T. 200).
Appellant spent two years at U.C.L.A. (1956 and
1957) where he developed an immunofluorescence test for

Herpes virus (T. 211).

He completed his Ph.D. studies in

1968 at the University of Utah where he participated in

programs dealing with the growth of large batches of tissue
culture cells.

While at the University of Utah appellant

and a number of his classmates and associates used flat
Pyrex plates covered with Saran wrap to hold the tissue
culture cells while they were propagating (T. 214).
During the fifteen years prior to 1968 appellant
used many diverse cell lines, including the FL cells, to
detect the presence of ANA and Herpes in a human patient
(T. 200, 211).

Appellant used isopropyl alcohol, ether

and methanol to "fix" the cells during this time (T. 201, 227),
and employed saline as a rinse in producing his early test
kits (T. 200).
In 1968 appellant met Edward J. Mawod, a stock
broker (T. 130).

Appellant described to Mr. Mawod a research

project which he was conducting which hopefully would
result in a new method to detect cancer.

Mr. Mawod then

introduced appellant to three other gentlemen who agreed to
raise capital to develop and market a cancer detection kit
(T. 130).

Microbiological Sciences, Inc. was incorporated,

a lab was built and appellant was elected corporate president
-3-
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and employed as its general manager.

On September 4, 1968

appellant and respondent entered into a Management Contract
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 22) and the development of a cancer
detection kit was commenced.

Microbiological Sciences, Inc.

transferred its stock to a "shell" corporation shortly
after it was organized and after another stock transfer and
name change, it became Microbiological Research Corporation
(hereinafter sometimes referred to as "IV'..RC") , the respondent
in this action.

In May of 1969, respondent ran out of funds

and was unable to purchase tumors necessary to the development
of the cancer detection kit (Deposition of Nadeem M. Muna at
7-8).
Appellant advised respondent's board of directors
that he felt that the commercial production of an ANA test
kit was possible using the company's existing lab.

Production

and sale of the ANA kit commenced in September of 1969 (T. 135).
In 1972 respondent began marketing a toxoplasmosis
test kit and in 1976, sale of a Herpes detection kit began
(~.

135, 207}.

The Herpes kit is an immunofluorescence kit

produced by using the same basic procedure as is used in
making the ANA kit (T. 100).

The toxoplasmosis kit is

manufactured by respondent according to the procedures outlined
in a manual published by the Center for Disease Control (T.
215-16).

The only variation employed by respondent is the

use of an ingredient called "Tween 80", which is also used
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by Dr. Jack Remmington, a California microbiologist who
specializes in toxoplasmosis.

The Hoffman-LeRoach company,

one of respondent's competitors, also utilizes Tween 80
(T. 216).
In 1970 respondent developed its own cell line
and began using it in its test kits instead of cell lines
named "FL" and "AV-3" (T. 203).

From 1970 through 1974

appellant, on respondent's behalf, wrote several letters as
well as a published article aimed at customers and potential
customers.

These documents claimed that respondent's test

kits were superior because they utilized respondent's own
special cell line (Plaintiff's Exhibits 1, 5 and 15).

In

1974, however, one of respondent's technicians caused the
loss of thio special cell line and respondent conunenced
using FL and AV-3 lines (T. 203, 205-06).

The basis of the

"sales pitch" contained in these documents was thus eliminated
and different marketing methods were required.
On August 14, 1972 respondent entered into an
exclusive distributorship agreement with Smith-Kline
Instruments, a California company.

This agreement granted

Smith-Kline the exclusive right to distribute respondent's
ANA and Toxoplasmosis kits as well as any other products
which respondent manufactured during the term of the
agreement (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2).

While this agreement was

in effect, technical employees of Smith-Kline Instruments
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worked in respondent's lab and assisted in the production of
respondent's kits (Deposition of Nadeem M. Muna at 18).

In

December of 1975 Smith-Kline Instruments terminated its
distributorship relationship with respondent and began selling
its own ANA kit (_T. 182, Deposition of Nadeem M. Muna at 15, 24).
Respondent has several competitors who manufacture and market
ANA Immunofluorescence, Herpes Immunofluorescence and
Toxoplasmosis kits (T. 217, 218, 236, 238).
Appellant served as respondent's corporate president
until February, 1978, when Mr. Mawod won the office in a
shareholder's election (T. 4, 5).

This election was preceded

by a "proxy fight", and on January 24, 1978 appellant wrote
a letter to all of the sha.reholders advising them that if he
lost the election, he intended to quit working for respondent
and start a competing business (Defendant's E}chibi t

1) •

Mr.

Mawed read this letter prior to the election (T. 63).
On February 28, 1978, after the shareholder's
election, appellant and respondent entered into an Employment
Agreement (Appendix "A"}.

This agreement purported to

employ appellant as a consultant, research microbiologist
and director of labs for respondent.

Appellant continued to

work in this capacity until on or about July 30, 1978, when
Mr. Mawod, on respondent's behalf, terminated appellant's
employment (T. 31}.
Appellant then began preparing to manufacture
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products similar to those sold by respondent.

On September

28, 1979, respondent commenced this action and appellant
has been judicially restrained from competing with respondent
since that date.

Prior to the trial of this case, appellant

had petitioned the trial court for an order requiring that
respondent post a bond pending the trial on the merits.

This

bond, which would have provided some protection for appellant
in the event that respondent's case was found to be without
merit, was denied by the trial court and the case progressed
to its present posture before this Court.
SUMMARY OF TECHNICAL PROCEDURES INVOLVED IN
MANUFACTURING ANA, HERPES AND TOXOPLASMOSIS
TEST KITS.
Due to the complex and technical nature of the manufacturing processes which are the subject of the instant case,
it is felt that a brief explanation would assist the Court
in better understanding the issues.

The following is extracted

from the testimony of two of respondent's witnesses, Carol
Golden, Ph.D., and Albert Leibovitz, as well as appellant's
testimony and references to the record have been omitted.
ANA Test Kit
This kit is used by various laboratories and hospitals
to test for the presence of anti-nuclear antibodies in a
patient.

When a patient's test reads positive, it is an
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indication that he has lupus erythematosus.
In order to manufacture the kit the respondent
propagates a number of FL or AV-3 human amnion cells in a growth
media.

The basic Minimum Essential Media is purchased from a

commercial supplier and respondent adds certain other nutrients.
Glass slides, each having eight wells, are placed in
a Pyrex baking dish and covered with the cells.

The baking

dish is covered with Saran wrap and the cells are allowed to
grow until one layer covers the baking dish.

The growth media

is removed and the slides are washed to remove unwanted matter
with a phosphate buffered saline solution.
The cells remaining on the wells of each slide are
fixed (the growth is stopped) using isopropyl alcohol, and
the slides are placed in a buffer and glycerine solution to
preserve them.

Respondent provides Antihuman Globulin which

has a fluorescein additive with each test kit.
The laboratory places the Antihuman Globulin on the
wells of the slide and a sample patient's blood is also
placed on the we11:

Each of the eight wells of the slide can

be used to test individual patients.

The slide is placed

under a fluorescence microscope and if a greenish-yellow
fluorescent color appears, the test is positive.
Herpes Test Kit
The Herpes 1 and 2 test kits are manufactured and
-8-
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used in virtually the same manner except that Herpes virus
is added to the slides in place of the Antihuman Globulin.
The respondent purchases its Herpes virus from the University
of Utah.
Toxoplasmosis Test Kit
This test does not employ the use of tissue culture
techniques.

A known parasite toxoplasmosis strain is inserted

into a living mouse's belly and when the mouse becomes inactive
and has ruffled fur the toxoplasmosis cells are removed.
These cells are placed on slides and killed with formaldehyde.
The slides are used by the laboratories and hospitals in much
the same manner as the two previously discussed tests.
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POINT I
THE l.978 EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT SUPERSEDED
THE 1968 EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT k~D BECAME
THE SOLE BINDING AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE
PARTIES.
A. THE LANGUAGE CONTAINED IN THE 1978
AGREEMENT EXPRESSLY TERMINATED ALL PRIOR
EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENTS.
An elementary principle of law allows that parties
to a contract may, by means of a new contract, put an end to
their old bargain and strike a new one; or, as stated in l7A
i'

~.

I

'
~

C.J.S., Contracts, sec. 394:

"As a contract is the result of

agreement, so an agreement may put an end to a contract."
Paragraph l of the 1978 employment agreement states:
"All previous employment agreements and understandings in
connection therewith are hereby mutually terminated and settled."
(Emphasis added.)

(Appendix "A" at 1).

A more succinct statement

of the intent of the parties regarding this point would be
difficult to draft.

The Utah Supreme Court has set forth a

clear guideline for discerning the intentions of the parties
to a contract:
Elementary~it is that in construing
contracts we seek to determine the intentions
of the parties. But it is also elementary
and of extreme practical importance that we
hold contracting parties to their clear and
understandable language deliberately
committed to writing and endorsed by them
as signatories thereto. Were this not so
business, one with another among our citizens,
would be relegated to the chaotic, and the
basic purpose of the law to supply enforceable
0
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rules of conduct for the maintenance and
improvement of an orderly society's
welfare and progress wo~ld find itself
impotent. It is not unreasonable to hold
one responsible for language which he
himself espouses. Such language is the
only implement he gives us to fashion a
determination as to the intentions of
the parties. Under such circumstances,
we should not be required to embosom
any request that we ignore that very
language. This is as it should be. The
rule excluding matters outside the four
corners of a clear, understandable
document, is a fair one, and one's
contentions concerning his intent should
extend no further than his own clear
expressions.
Jensen's Used Cars v. Rice, 7 Utah2d 276, 323 P.2d 259, 260261 (1958).

See also:

Oberhansly v. Earle, 572 P.2d 1384

(Utah 1977).
Language of a comparably express tenor was given
such a strict interpretation in Burns v. Reliance Life Ins.
co. of Pittsburgh, 122 W.Va. 708, 12 S.E.2d 509 (1941), a
case involving employment contracts signed in 1924 and 1935
which were asserted to terminate and supersede an employment
contract signed in 1915.

Both the 1924 and 1935 contracts

contained essentially the following language:
This agreement shall take effect on the
20th day of February, 1924, and all previous
communications between the parties hereto,
verbal or written, are hereby abrogated and
withdrawn, and this agreement, when duly
signed and approved, constitutes the
agreement between the parties hereto, and

-11-
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no modification of this accepted agreement
shall be binding upon the parties hereto,
or either of them, unless in writing
hereon duly accepted by the second party
and approved by the proper officers of
the first party. Id. at 510.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held the abovequoted language to be sufficient to effect a termination of
the 1915 contract.

Appellant contends that the express

language of paragraph 1 of the 1978 employment agreement
in the instant case is even more explicit than that at issue
in Bi.1rns, supra.
Respondent is likely to argue that, despite the
express language, it could not have intended to substitute
the 1978 agreement for the 1968 agreement

be~ause

that it had no knowledge of the 1968 agreement.

it contends
In Fogdall v.

Lewis & Clark College, 590 P.2d 775 (Or.App. 1979), facial
inconsistencies between two contracts of employment were found
to be sufficient evidence of intent for the later agreement to
supersede the prior agreement.

The court also stated, "The

law of contracts is not concerned with parties' undisclosed
intents and ideas.
and overt acts."

It gives heed only to their communications
Id. at 780.

Appellant maintains that the

facial inconsistencies between the contracts at issue in the
instant case are sufficient evidence of respondent's intent.
This Court should find that paragraph 1 of the 1978 employment
agreement terminated the 1968 employment agreement and thus
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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conclude that the 1978 agreement superseded the 1968 agreement
and became a substitute therefor.
A second principle of contract interpretation is
equally supportive of appellant's theory of substitution of
contracts:

a contract drawn up by a party's attorney must

be strictly construed against that party.
22 Utah2d 196, 450 P.2d 467 (1969).

Guinand v. Walton,

See also:

Wingets, Inc.

v. Bitters, 28 Utah2d 231, 500 P.2d 1007 (1972); Skousen v.
Smith, 27 Utah2d 169, 493 P.2d 1003 (1972).

In the instant

case, the 1978 agreement having been drawn up by respondent's
attorney (T. 19), it must be strictly construed against
respondent.

If the language of paragraph 1 of the 1978

agreement is to be given the force and binding effect dictated
by Utah case law, the 1978 agreement must be interpreted as
terminating the 1968 agreement and operating as the sole
binding contract between the parties.
B.
THE 1978 AGREEMENT BECAME A SUBSTITUTED
CONTRACT FOR THE 1968 AGREEMENT BY OPERATION
OF LAW.
In 17A C.J.S., Contracts, sec. 395, it is stated
that:

"A contract complete in itself will be conclusively

presumed to supersede and discharge another one made prior
thereto between the same parties concerning the same subject
matter, where the terms of the latter are inconsistent with
those of the former so that they cannot subsist together."
(Emphasis added.)

This maxim has received a strong
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endorsement from the Supreme Court of Nebraska in Goings v.
Gerken, 200 Neb. 247, 263 N.W.2d 655 (1978), wherein the
court quoted the language of In re Estate of Wise, 144 Neb.
273, 13 N.W.2d 146 (1944):

"A contract complete in itself

will be conclusively presumed to supersede and discharge
another one made prior thereto between the same parties
concerning the same subject matter, where terms of the later
are inconsistent with those of the former so that they cannot
subsist together."

263 N.W.2d 655, 658 (Emphasis added.)

The notion that a subsequent contract may be
substituted for a prior contract between the same parties is
recognized by the Utah Supreme Court in Hanover Limited v.
Fields, 568 P.2d 751 (Utah 1977).

In Hanover Limited, a later

earnest money agreement which was "complete on its face and
contained no ambiguities" was found to have be.en substituted
for a prior real estate contract.

Id. at 753.

Appellant

contends that the court's logic in Hanover is applicable with
equal force in the case of two employment contracts.
Appellant's theory on thi.s point is supported by
the findings of the Court of Appeals for the Six:th Circuit
in Decca Records v. Republic Recording Company, 235 F.2d 360
(6th Cir. 1956).

In Decca Records, a pianist had signed an

employment agreement on an unspecified date prior to 1952
with Tennessee Records.

On February 9, 1953, the pianist,

Del Wood, signed a new employment contract with Republic
Recording Company.

(In Decca Records, Republic Recording
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Company was the successor to Tennessee Records, just as
in the instant case where Microbiological Research Corporation
was the successor to Microbiological Sciences, Inc.).

In

finding that the 1953 employment contract was a substituted
contract for the prior employment agreement, the court stated,
But the legal effect of the new contract
afterward executed between Republic and
Del Wood was to rescind and supersede
the former contract executed between
Tennessee and Del Wood, which had been
assigned to Republic. A second contract
of a later date that an earlier contract
containing the same subject matter, but
containing terms inconsistent with the
former contract, will supersede the
former contract even though there is no
express agreement that the new contract
shall have that effect. Id. at 363.
(Citations omitted.)
~
The express termination clause in the 1978 agreement in the
instant case has been previously emphasized by appellant.

It

should also be noted that the 1978 agreement contains terms
pertaining to virtually every individual subject discussed in
the 1968 agreement.
In determining whether a new employment contract
will be found to supersede a prior employment contract in the
absence of express language to that effect, courts have often
closely scrutinized the employee's position to see if there
has been a change of circumstances.

If a significant change

of circumstances has occurred, the new employment contract
is more likely to be deemed a substitute for the old one.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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A change of circumstances has included such fact patterns as
a termination and a rehiring, a change

in offices, positions,

titles or roles by the employee, changes in compensation,
changes in duties, lapse of time, and various other factors.
In the· following cases, the court placed great weight on whether
a change in circumstances had occurred.
In M. S. Jacobs and Associates, Inc. v. Duffley, 303
A.2d 921 (Pa. 1973), a salesman signed an employment contract
in 1968 which contained a covenant against competition.

In

1969, the employee tendered his resignation, but remained
employed after receiving a raise.

The Supreme Court of

Pennsylvania found that no novation of the 1968 contract had
occurred in 1969 because "the resignation was never accepted
and • . . appellee's pay was never stopped."

Id. at 923.

In the instant case, respondent admits that appellant was
"discharged" and subsequently entered into a "new employment
agreement".

(R. 132).

Moreover, appellant's status changed

from that of President and General Manager to Director of Labs
and consultant, his salary went from $12,000 per year to
$17.00 per hour, and appellant was no longer to be reimbursed
for business expenses that he incurred.
"B").

(Appendices "A" and

These facts constitute a change in circumstances which

was missing in M. S. Jacobs and Associates, Inc., supra.
If the 1978 agreement is not found to ha.ve superseded
the 1968 agreement in its entirety, the two agreements should
at least be read together, with the inconsistent parts of
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the 1978 contract superseding the prior 1968 conflicting
provisions.

Such an approach was utilized by the Supreme

Court of North Dakota in Metcalf v. Security Intern. Ins.
~·

261 N.W.2d 795 (N.D. 1977), wherein the court read

employment contracts executed in 1963, 1967 and 1972 together,
holding that later inconsistent provisions superseded prior
clauses which were in conflict.

In the instant case, the

1978 and 1968 agreements are inconsistent in essentially
three <.re as:

(1) appellant's position, title and responsibilities;

(2) compensation; and (3) the non-competition clauses.
Specifically, these clauses read as follows:
(1) appellant's position, title and responsibilities:
1968 agreement
Management Contract
1. The Company hereby employs Muna as its
President and General Manager for a period
of five (5) years from the date hereof,
and thereafter, from year to year, unless
terminated by either party hereto by
written notice at least sixty (60) days
prior to any anniversary date of this
Agreement.
1978 agreement
Employment Agreement
3. Muna agrees to act as a consultant
and research microbiologist for Micro upon
such problems and projects as the management
of Micro shall specify, and shall be
Dir. of Labs (CDC).
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4.
When not engaged in consulting work,
Muna shall pursue the designated research
projects and shall devote as much time to
said employment as his health permits, but
not to exceed 40 hours per week, without
prior written permission.
(2) compensation:
1968 agreement
4. The Company shall pay Muna a basic
salary of Twelve Thousand Dollars ($12,000)
per annum, payable in equal monthly
installments, for all services rendered
by Muna for the Company. The Company shall
also reimburse Muna for all expenses
incurred by him in the furtherance of the
business of the Company, approved by the
Board of Directors of the Company.
1978 agreement
4. Micro shall pay to Muna the sum of
$17.00 per hour, payable semi-monthly,
for such consulting and research work.
(No provision was included for the
reimbursement of expenses.)
(3) non-competition clauses:
1968 agreement
6. Muna agrees that during the terms of
this Agreement he will not engage in any
other commercial activity in any way
competitive with the business of the
Company, or its affiliated companies, and
that, for a period of five (5) years after
leaving the employ of the Company, he will
not engage in any way, directly or indirectly,
in any business competitive with the Company
or its affiliated companies any (sic) any
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state in which any of them do business.
Muna further agrees that he will not
disclose to any other person any
information which is the property of
the Company or its affiliated companies.
1978 agreement
·6. During the term of this Agreement
Muna shall not act as a consultant for,
or accept employment from any competitor
of Micro nor shall he compete directly
or indirectly with Micro.
(The term of the 1978 agreement was
continuous with termination upon thirty
days notice. )
Each clause recited above is so inconsistent with
its counterpart in the opposite agreement that the clauses
cannot be read together.

The clauses from the 1978 agreement

must be read as superseding those in the 1968 agreement.
Appellant acknowledges that the intent of the
parties is largely determinative of whether the clauses
recited above from the 1978 agreement should supersede those
from the 1968 agreement.

As is stated in 15 WILLISTON ON

CONTRACTS, THIRD EDITION SECTION 1826, p. 485-86:
'A contract containing a term inconsistent
with a term of an earlier contract between
the same parties is interpreted as including
an agreement to rescind the inconsistent
term in the earlier contract. The parties
may or may not at the same time agree to
rescind all the other provisions of the
erlier (sic) contract.' The extent of the
substitution is a matter of their intent.
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This Court has stated that a party's assent to
a substituted contract may be shown by surrounding
circumstances.

Robison v. Hansen, 594 P.2d 867 (Utah 1979).

In Robison, an assignor took possession of a car wash from
his assignee in compromise of their prior agreement to have
the assignee run the car wash.

Justice Maughan, citing

6 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, sec. 1293, p. 197, endorsed the
following principle:
The substituted contract, whether of
rescission or modification, may be
expressed otherwise than in words.
Such an implied, or inferred, agreement,
found by interpretation of conduct
instead of words, has the same legal
operation as if it had been expressed
in words.
594 P.2d 867, 870.
Respondent will doubtless contend that it could
not have intended the 1978 agreement to supersede the 1968
agreement because respondent maintains that it was unaware of
the 1968 agreement.

Appellant asserts that the intent of the

parties to substitute the 1978 agreement for the 1968
agreement can be shown from the surrounding circumstances.
In 1968, appellant was to be President and General Manager
of respondent and signed an agreement entitled "Management
ConLract".

As the years passed, appellant became increasingly

dissatisfied with the corporate operation, his dissatisfaction
culiminating in a letter to the shareholders of respondent

-20-
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expressing his intent to terminate his employment with
respondent if appellant lost the upcoming "proxy fight".
(Defendant's Exhibit 1)

Appellant then suffered a serious

heart attack which reduced his capacity to work on a fulltime basis.
and

w~s

Appellant subsequently lost the "proxy fight"

ousted from his management position.

It was after

all these occurrences that appellant and respondent entered
into the 1978 "Employment Agreement".

Such circumstances

indicate that respondent must have intended the 1978
agreement to supersede the 1968 agreement.
Finally, two general principles concerning
employment contracts must be emphasized.

First, ambiguities

in an employment contract must be construed most strongly
against the employer who drafted the contract.

National

Cash Register Company v. Lightner, 154 Colo. 98, 388 P.2d
781 (.1964).

Second, covenants not to compete contained in

a contract of employment are to be strictly construed
against the employer.

Eastern Distributing Co., Inc. v.

Flynn, 222 Kan. 666, 567 P.2d 1371 (1977).

Both of these

concepts support a determination that the 1978 agreement
superseded the 1968 agreement.
In summary, appellant contends that the express
language of the 1978 agreement terminated the 1968 agreement
and therefore the 1978 agreement became the sole binding
contract between the parties.

If the Court should find
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that there was no express termination, then the facial
inconsistencies between the two agreements, the rules of
strict contract interpretation and the policy of favoring
the employee when dealing with a non-competition clause
drafted by the employer, all support a finding that the
1978 agreement superseded the 1968 agreement.
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POINT II
APPELLANT DID NOT DELIBERATELY CONCEAL THE
EXISTENCE OF THE 1968 EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT
NOR DID HE HAVE A FIDUCIARY DUTY TO
VOLUNTEER ANY INFORMATION CONCERNING ITS
EXISTENCE OR CONTENTS.
The finding of fact by the trial court that
appellant deliberately concealed the existence of the 1968
employment agreement is not supported by sufficient evidence.
Appellant had no recollection of having signed the 1968
agreement until it was shown to him by counsel for respondent
at the hearing on appellant's motion for summary judgment.
The trial transcript is devoid of sufficient evidence to
form a substantial basis for respondent's claim that
appellant deliberately concealed the existence of the 1968
agreement.

The trial court's finding that appellant

deliberately concealed the agreement is, therefore, erroneous.
This Court must correct an erroneous finding of fact by
the trial court which is not supported by a substantial
basis in the evidence.

Cornia v. Cornia, 546 P.2d 890 (Utah 1976).

A. APPELLANT HAD NO FIDUCIARY DUTY TO
VOLUNTEER ANY INFORMATION CONCERNING THE
EXISTENCE OR CONTENTS OF THE 1968 AGREEMENT.
In its conclusions of law, the trial court states
that,
Defendant had a fiduciary duty during the
negotiations on his employment contract
of February 28, 1978, to reveal to the
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new officers of the plaintiff the existence
and the terms and conditions of his employment
contract of September 4, 1968, and that
his concealment of that employment contract
made a nullity of the employment contract
of February 28, 1978.
Appellant contends that the dramatic changes in
his involvement with respondent which precipitated the 1978
agreement destroyed any fiduciary or confidential relationship he may have had with respondent as its former president.
Specifically, appellant contends that the following
circumstances removed any duty to volunteer information to
respondent during contract negotiations in 1978:
(1)

On

January 24, 1978, appellant sent a letter

(Defendant's Exhibit 1) to the stockholders of respondent
informing them of his discontent with the management of
respondent and of his intent to resign and start a new
business if Mr. Mawed should win the upcoming "proxy fight";
(2)

Mr. Mawod did, in fact, win the "proxy fight"

and appellant was ousted as president and general manager
of respondent;
(3)

Appellant's personal differences and

disagreements with Mr. Mawod, with whom appellant negotiated
the 1978 agreement, were clear from the face of appellant's
letter of January 28, 1978, and were known to Mr. Mawed
prior to the negotiations of the 1978 agreement (T.63);
(4)

Appellant's status had, at the time of

negotiations on the 1978 agreement, changed from that of
full-time president and general manager with salary and
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expense account to part-time hourly consultant with no
official duties;
(5)

Mr. Mawed had maintained constant involvement

with respondent from his activities as a promoter in 1968
to president in 1978;
(6)

The negotiations for the 1978 agreement were

carried on at arm's length.
In Renshaw v. Tracy Loan and Trust Co., 87 Utah 364,
49 P.2d 403 (1935), the Utah Supreme Court emphasized the

importance of scrutinizing the types of circumstances listed
above when assessing whether a fiduciary duty existed:
It is not every relationship to which
the term "fiduciary" or "confidential"
might be applied with some degree of
reason or plausibility that will authorize,
by itself alone, the creation of the
presumption of fraud in the dealings
between each other of those occupying
that relationship. Every business
transaction involves a certain amount
of confidence and trust. Equity will
not discourage transactions by creating
presumptions of their fraudulent nature,
except in those cases where the
transactions occur between parties to
relationships which by their very nature
it is the policy of the law to protect
one of the parties thereto on the theory
that they are not dealing on an equal
basis because of the confidence which
one party to the relationship is
presumed to have in the other. It
is always a question, therefore, of
the actual relationship between the
parties that must be inquired into,
and not whether the terms "fiduciary,"
"confidential," or "trust," can, with
some degree of reason, be applied to
the relationship.
(Emphasis added.)
Id. at 404.
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Appellant maintains that his relationship with Mr. Mawed and
his estrangement from respondent as a corporation prevented
the imposition of a fiduciary duty.
In Vargas v. Esquire, Inc., 166 F.2d 651 (7th
Cir. 1948), cert. denied 335 U.S. 813, Mr. Vargas had been
working under the terms of an initial employment contract
for some three years when a second employment contract was
entered into.

Vargas sought to avoid the second contract by

claiming that his employer's agent had breached a fiduciary
duty by failing to disclose the terms of the contract.
Despite extensive business, personal and social involvement
between Vargas and the agent, no fiduciary or confidential
relationship was found.

The court stated:

The [fiduciary] relationship arises
wherever the circumstances make it certain
that confidence was reposed on one side
and domination and influence resulted
on the other. But where a fiduciary
relationship does not exist as a matter
of law, the burden of proving facts from
which such a relationship arises is upon
the person seeking to establish the
relationship, and the proof must be
clear, convincing, and so strong as to
lead to but one possible conclusion.
(Citations omitted.) Id. at 653.
Because appellant's positions as president and general manager
had been terminated and his dissatisfaction with the
management of respondent was so well-known, a fiduciary
relationship cannot be established as a matter of law;
furthermore, appellant's relationship with Mr. Mawed and the
circumstances surrounding the negotiation of the 1978 contract
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prevent any finding of a fiduciary relationship resulting
from confidence or trust.
The significance of appellant's discharge as
president and general manager of respondent is emphasized
in 19 Am.Jur.2d, Corporation, Sec. 1273, p. 681:

"After

there has been a severance of official relationship, either
because of resignation or removal, generally, a director or
officer occupies no relation of trust or confidence to the
corporation."

In Renpak v. Oppenheimer, 104 So.2d 642

(Fla.App. 1958), the rule is stated as, "After there has been
a severance of official relation, either because of resignation
or removal, the former director or officer may then deal with
the corporation thereafter like any other stranger."
at 644.

Id.

Appellant was entitled to deal with respondent as

a stranger would have.
The typical situation in which a failure to
disclose certain facts is deemed a breach of a fiduciary
relationship is found in Elder v. Clawson, 14 Utah 2d 379,
384 P.2d 802 (1963), wherein a vendor failed to disclose a
quarantine affecting the land sought by the purchaser.

The

court, quoting from 23 Am.Jur. 857, Fraud and Deceit, IV
Concealment, Sec. BO, stated:
"Knowledge that the other party to a
contemplated transaction is acting under
a mistaken belief as to certain facts
is a factor in determining that a duty
of disclosure is owing. There is much
authority to the effect that if one party
to a contract or transaction has superior
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knowledge, or knowledge which is not
within the fair and reasonable reach
of the other party and which he could
not discover by the exercise of
reasonable diligence, or means of
knowledge which are not open to both
parties alike, he is under a legal
obligation to speak, and his silence
constitutes fraud, especially when the
other party relies upon him to communicate to him the true state of facts
to enable him to judge of the
expediency of the bargain." 384 P.2d
at 805.
Appellant did not possess superior knowledge
which could not have been obtained by respondent through the
exercise of reasonable diligence.

A mere examination of the

corporate files by Mr. Mawod would have revealed a copy of
the contract.

Nor did appellant occupy a position of trust or

confidence with respect to respondent or respondent's agent
which would give rise to a duty of disclosure.

Most

importantly, appellant occupied no formal position which
would impose a duty of disclosure upon him by operation of
law.

Because no duty to speak existed, appellant's failure

to recall the existence of the 1968 agreement and his
resulting silence should not vitiate the 1978 agreement.
B. RESPONDENT HAD KNOWLEDGE OF THE 1968
AGREEMENT BECAUSE A CORPORATION IS CHARGED
WITH THE KNOWLEDGE OF ITS OFFICERS.
The 1968 agreement was signed by appellant and
attested by one Daniel E. King, secretary of respondent.
While the signature of the vice-president of respondent does
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not appear on any of the copies of the 1968 agreement given
to appellant, respondent cannot deny that the agreement was
signed by its vice-president since it is asserting the
validity of the agreement.
As stated in 3 Fletcher eye. Corp. (Perm Ed)
Sec. 801, p. 38,
Subject to certain qualifications and
exceptions hereinafter noted, the general
rule is well established that a corporation
is charged with constructive knowledge,
regardless of its actual knowledge, of all
material facts of which its officer or agent
receives notice or acquires knowledge
while acting in the course of his employment within the scope of his authority,
even though the officer or agent does not
in fact communicate his knowledge to the
corporation. The rule does not depend
upon the fact that the agent has disclosed
the knowledge or information to his
principal, "subject to the exceptions
named, the law conclusively presumes
that he has done so, and charges the
principal accordingly." In other
words this rule rests upon the presumption
that the agent will communicate to the
corporation the facts learned by him, as
it is his duty to it, and whether he
performs such duty or not, the corporation
is bound. So notice to an agent of a
corporation relating to any matter of
which he has the management and control
is notice to the corporation.
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted the principle of imputing
knowledge to a corporation through the knowledge of its
officers in Lowe v. April Industries, Inc., 531 P.2d 1297
(Utah 1974).

Moreover, as is further stated in Fletcher,

supra, sec. 801, p. 38, "if notice to or knowledge of a
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corporate officer is such as to be imputable to the corporation,
the subsequent death, discharge, removal, termination of
office or the like, without any actual communication of
the information to the corporation, does not affect the force
of the imputation of notice."

(Emphasis added.)

In a case involving the issue of whether a
corporation was deemed to have imputed knowledge of the
contents of a contract for the purchase of mining cars,
the courtof Appeals of Kentucky held that the corporation
was deemed to have the knowledge of the corporate officer
who signed the contract.

Enterprise Foundry & Mach. Works

v. Miner's Elkhorn coal Co., 241 Ky. 779, 45 S.W.2d 470 (1931).
Appellant contends that in the instant case, where
two officers of respondent signed the 1968 agreement,
respondent should be deemed to have had knowledge of the
existence and contents of the 1968 agreement in February of
1978.

Respondent must have retained a copy of the 1968

agreement, as it was respondent who produced the agreement at
the hearing on appellant's motion for summary judgment.
This Court should not permit one party to a contract to avoid
searching its files and exercising reasonable diligence in
ascertaining facts pertinent to the contract under negotiation.
The notion of imputation of knowledge is sound and, in the
instant case, prevents respondent from asserting a lack of
knowledge of the existence of the 1968 agreement.

The findings

of fact and conslusions of law of the trial court on this
point must be reversed.
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POINT III
RESPONDENT FAILED TO MEET ITS BURDEN OF
PROVING THAT TRADE SECRETS ARE INVOLVED
IN THE MANUFACTURE OF THE TEST KITS.
While respondent has never alleged in any precise
manner the items or processes which it considers to be trade
secrets and findings of fact and conclusions of law entered
by the trial court are unclear on this point, appellant
believes that the following is a comprehensive list of all
possible items or processes which respondent may claim to
be trade secrets:
ANA and HERPES KITS:
(1)

the use of "FL" or "AV-3" human amnion cell

(2)

the addition of tryptose phosphate broth,

lines;

Hepes buffer and/or Lactalbumen

Hydrolysate to the minimum

essential media (MEM) ;
(3)

the use of isopropyl alcohol as a fixative;

(4)

rinsing the slides three times with a

solution containing sodium bicarbonate;
(5)

the use of large Pyrex plates, tape and

Saran wrap in processing the slides.
TOXOPLASMOSIS KIT:
(6)

the use of "Tween 80" as a deterring agent on

the slides.
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ALL KITS:
(7)

customer lists for all kits.

The definition of "trade secret" found in Section 757

1

comment b of Restatement, Torts (1939), has been widely
accepted by courts dealing with the problem of trade secrets:
A trade secret may consist of any
fo;mula, pattern, device or compilation
of information which is used in one's
business, and which gives him an opportunity
to obtain an advantage over competitors
who do not know or use it . • •
·
An exact definition of a trade secret
is not possible. Some factors to be
considered in determining whether given
information is one's trade secret are:
(1) the extent to which the information
is known outside of his business; (2)
the extent to which it is known by
employees and others involved in his
business; (3) the extent of measures
taken by him to guard the secrecy of
the information; (4) the value of the
information to him and to his competitors;
(5) the amount of effort or money expended
by him in developing the information;
(6) the ease or difficulty with which
the information could be properly
acquired or duplicated by others.
Appellant contends that an application of the
Restatement definition and determinative factors to the
seven items and processes listed above and discussed below
reveals that none of the

"secrets"

is, in fact, deserving

of protection as a trade secret.
ANA and HERPES KITS
(1) the use of "FL" or "AV-3" human amnion cell

lin~--
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The use of these particular cell lines as a trade secret
cannot withstand the application of any one of the six
factors.

The FL and AV-3 cell lines are known to microbiologists

both within and outside of the business of producing disease
test kits.

Dr. Leibovitz testified that he had grown FL

cells previously and was familiar with the AV-3 line (T.80-81).
Appellant testified that, in fact, the FL line had been used
by MRC only after it had lost its own original cell line
in 1974, (T.203-06), and that monkey cells work as well as
human cells as a substrate (T.211).

In 1970, Kenneth Hayami

Kato published a thesis for his Master of Science Degree in
which he concluded that human, mouse, monkey and chicken cells
all produced the desired results sought in the immunofluorescent
process (Defendant's Exhibit 2).
THe FL and AV-3 lines are not guarded by respondent
as secrets; they have comparatively little value, per se,
to respondent; MRC expended no effort or money in developing
the lines; respondent's competitors could, and in all
likelihood do, purchase these lines for their production
processes.

In short, respondent obtains no competitive

advantage from the use of FL and AV-3 cell lines because
they are equally available on a commercial basis to competitors.
(2) the addition of tryptos phosphate broth, Hepes
buffer and/or Lactalburnen

Hydrolysate to the minimum essential

media (MEM)--This particular procedure must fall short of
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trade secret status because even respondent cannot claim to
know the significance, if any, of the addition of some or all
of the three supplements to the dedia.

Respondent's own

witness characterized the effect of the additives and their
role as "black magic".

(T.83).

Testimony was also elicited

that established the existence of other means of growing
cells in a media that were as good as respondent's method.
(T.85).

The use of these additives is common knowledge

among microbiologists who seek to grow cells in a media.
The use of these additives is no more a trade secret than
a gardener's choice of a particular fertilizer to apply to
his lawn.
(3) the use of isopropyl alcohol as a fixative-This procedure affords respondent no commercial advantage and
is merely a choice of one of several equally effective
alternatives.

Respondent's witnesses established the

acceptance within the scientific community of isopropyl
alcohol as a fixative and testified that propanol, methanol,
ethyl alcohol and acetone are also equally effective
fixatives.

(T.88, 118).

Applying the Restatement factors

supports the conclusion that respondent derives no unusual
value or benefit from the use of isopropyl alcohol and that
respondent's competitors are aware of the procedure even if
they do not already use it.

-34-
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(4) rinsing the slides three times with a solution
containing sodium bicarbonate--The use of bicarbonate is
another example of a procedure whose significance is unknown
to respondent.

Dr. Leibovitz testified that he did not know

if the sodium bicarbonate did anything.

(T.87).

Dr. Golden

also could not testify to any beneficial effect of the
sodium bicarbonate.

(T.125).

Appellant maintains that

respondent's process is essentially a very simple one, known
and understood by microbiologists in general, which has
been clouded by purported complexity.

The presence of

"black magic" additives and unexplained elements does not
change a fundamentally simple process.

If respondent's logic

is expanded, one of two unsupportable results obtains:
(a) a legitimate secret formula can become a second "secret"
formula by the addition of one unexplained and possibly nonfunctional element; or (b) any combination of unexplained
and possibly non-functional components can be a "secret"
formula.

Such is not the law of trade secrets.

Respondent also maintains that rinsing the slides three
times (as opposed to one, two, four, five or any other number
of times) is a trade secret.

The purpose of rinsing the slides

is to cleanse them, and common knowledge dictates that the
more times something is cleansed, the cleaner it becomes.
Trial testimony further emphasized this obvious conclusion.
(T.88-89).

Appellant submits that the three rinses are

indicative of the care taken in the production of the slides
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and not a part of any secret process.

care taken in the

production of an item does not warrant protection as a
proprietary interest.
(5) the use of large Pyrex plates, tape and Saran wrap
in processing the slides--A basic element in a trade secret
in an employer-employee relationship is that the secret must
have been disclosed, evolved or discovered after the
employee began to work for the employer.

An employee's

knowledge, skill and experience which he brings with him to
the employment relationship remain his after the relationship
ends.

Tempo Instrument Inc. v. Logitek, Inc., 229 F.Supp. 1

(E.D.N.Y. 1964).

Appellant testified that he was taught to

use the technique utilizing Pyrex plates, tape and Saran wrap
by a Dr. Hale at the University of Utah Virology Department
prior to going to work for respondent in 1968.

Moreover,

each student in Dr. Hale's class was instructed in the
technique.

This procedure can hardly be termed secret.

should also be noted that Douglas

w.

It

Hill, Ph.D., used this

exact same procedure as early as 1964 while doing tissue
culture work for the Army at the university of Utah.

It has

been published in several reports, disclosed in at least
two theses and is therefore part of the public domain.

(R.115).

Dr. Golden testified that this technique was an
efficient way to process large numbers of slides, but
that other methods of accomplishing that goal are available,
-36-
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e.g., a plastic stacking device (T.120).

If respondent's

competitors can obtain the same level of efficiency by
alternate means, respondnet cannot claim that the technique
that it learned from appellant is proprietary.

To deprive

appellant of the use of this procedure would be to impose
a forfeiture of knowledge that was in no way gained from
his employment with respondent.
TOXOPLASMOSIS KITS
(6) the use of "Tween 80" as a deterring agent
on the slides--Dr. Golden testified that respondent's procedure
in manufacturing the toxoplasmosis kits is "similar to that
recommended by the Center for Disease control except for
our purposes, we incorporate a deterring agent, Tween 80,
T-w-e-e-n 80, into the suspending fluid to keep the toxo
from settling to the edges of this little well on the slide."
(T.108).

She went on to acknowledge that, despite the fact

that her job with respondent was her first experience with
commercial laboratories, she was aware that a Dr. Jack
Rernrnington, a "world authority on toxoplasmosis (T.20), also
used Tween 80.

(T.126).

Appellant testified that Hoffman-

LeRoach company used Tween 80 as well (T.216).

The properties

of Tween 80 as a deterring agent are known to the scientific
community and its use by respondent is incidental to the
basic immunoflourescent process.

Because of its incidental

nature, the use of Tween 80 is of relatively little value to
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respondent or its competitors; therefore, it is not deserving
of protection as a trade secret under the Restatement test,
supra.
ALL KITS
(7) customer lists--The only evidence concerning
the alleged proprietary nature of a customer list is found
in the deposition of Edward J. Mawod.

Mr. Mawod testified

that such a list does exist, and that it was compiled from
sources including referrals from existing customers,
inquiries from journal advertisements, state health
institutions and lists obtained from the federal customs
department (Deposition of Edward J.

~awod

46, 48, 51).

Mr.

Mawod also testified that appellant had suggested names to be
contacted and placed on the list (Deposition of Edward J. Mawod
49).

The overwhelming majority of customers on the list

were laboratories and hospitals, both of which are readily
accessible in telephone books, trade journals or other
public sources.

Mr. Mawod estimated the number of customers

at three hundred (Deposition of Edward J. Mawod 46), which is
not an unusually large number of customers for a business
selling products on a worldwide basis.

Appellant contends

that respondent has not shown the requisite elements for
establishing a proprietary interest in the customer list.
Most notably, respondent expended very little effort and

'

money in developing the list and made no attempt to keep
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the list secret until Mr. Mawod took over as president of
respondent (T. 65).

Because of respondent's failure to carry

his burden on this issue, appellant should be permitted to
contact any potential customers of his choosing.
Several general points concerning respondent's
overall production of test kits and claimed trade secrets
must be emphasized.

Most importantly, respondent failed to

rigorously maintain a high level of secrecy as set forth in
the Restatement and as required by the subsequent case law.
First, respondent did not institute security procedures at
the lab until relatively late in appellant's tenure of
employment.

Appellant started to work in 1968, yet

non-competition clauses in employee's contracts were not
required until 1974 and then only because non-technical
members of management requested that such contracts be used
(T. 27).

The locked, fire-proof file, visitor logbook and

visitor non-disclosure forms were all implemented by Mr.
Mawod only after he became president of respondent in
1978 (T. 65).

Respondent is apparently. attempting to assert

that, even though Mr. Mawod is not qualified to testify
about the technical, unique or secret aspects of the test
kits (T. 58), his actions in attempting to protect certain
information renders this information secret and/or proprietary.
Second, all of respondent's claimed secrets have been revealed
in the literature of the scientific conununity.

Dr.

Stanley Marcus was asked this question:
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"Dr. Marcus, in your opinion is there
anything that is not published in the literature
or not generally known to a competent
microbiologist that he would need to know
in order to~manufacture either an ANA test
kit, and a Herpes, or a Toxoplasmosis
kit in a commercial quantity?"
A.

No.

(T.

239).

Appellant also testified:
"In my opinion, everything that MRC
or any other manufacturer has in the
biological field, is found in the
literature. If you don't believe me,
take a look at the references they put to
document their work and you can open
a whole door of references as to where
all this information has come from.
(T.

216).

In addition to articles by other authors on the
subject, appellant himself had published an article in
1966 detailing the procedure, parameters and methodology
of immunofluorescence and the production of test slides
(T. 199).

Defendant's Exhibits 2, 3 and 5 were also

documents providing information on the process at issue
(T.

209-10, 215) •
A fitting description of the futility of belated

efforts aimed at establishing secrecy is found in 12 Business
Organizations,MILGRIM, TRADE SECRETS, Sec. 2.03, p. 2-25:
But whether secrecy is lost through
seepage in conduct of business, sale or
exposition of a product embodying the secret,
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disclosure of the idea through a trade
or technical publication, or by way of
a patent, or by unprotected use in a
foreign country, the principle remains:
a secret on the wing cannot be recalled.
(Emphasis added.)
Respondent has failed to prove that any of the claimed
proprietary interests are sufficiently secret to warrant
protection.
Respondent has also failed to establish that the
claimed secrets are of value to it or its competitors.
As has been shown, supra, several of the processes cannot
be explained by respondent and others have readily available
alternatives.
is missing.

Thus, the value element of the Restatement test
Significantly, no showing has been made that

respondent expended large amounts of money or effort in
developing the process for making the test kits.

As has been

emphasized before, appellant possessed the skill, knowledge,
experience and techniques needed to make the kits before he
began working for respondent.

Mr. Mawed merely afforded

appellant an opportunity to continue using his skills,
which, in turn, gave Mr. Mawed the opportunity to participate
in a money-making enterprise.

Respondent has not shown

which, if any, new techniques or processes were unknown to
appellant in 1968 and discovered only after he began his
employment with respondent.

Lastly, appellant has shown that

the supposedly secret information could be easily duplicated
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by other competent microbiologists by simply using the
published literature and independent research.

In short,

respondent has failed to meet the accepted criteria of the
Restatement test and, therefore, no trade secrets can be
established.
Without burdening this Court with lengthy quotations,
appellant invites the Court to consider an excellent
discussion of the competing policy arguments involved in
an employer-employee trade secret case, found in Wexler v.
Greenberg, 399 Pa. 569, 160 A.2d 430 (1960).

While Wexler

did not involve an express covenant assigning the employee's
discoveries to the employer, the reasoning the the Supreme
court of Pennsylvania is applicable to the instant case
because appellant contends that no novel discoveries were made
by appellant after he began work for respondent.

Appellant

I

contends that, as the court found in Wexler, the policies
in favor of economic mobility and personal freedom in
pursuing a livelihood outweigh those supporting the furtherance
of "investment in research" by private business.
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POINT IV
THE TWO-YEAR INJUNCTION IMPOSED UPON APPELLA.~T
BY THE TRIAL COURT LACKS SUFFICIENT SPECIFICITY
AND UNREASONABLY RESTRAINS APPELL.AJ.~T FROM
PURSUING A LIVELIHOOD.
The memorandum decision entered by the trial court
on August 16, 1979, states,
THE DEFENDANT is further enjoined and restrained
from competing with plaintiff in any of it's
(sic) product lines for a period of two (2)
years from date of entry of this Judgment.
(R. 190)
The Conclusions of Law entered by the trial court state at
paragraph 4:
That defendant should be restrained for
a period of two years from the entry of this
judgment from competing with the plaintiff
in plaintiff's present product lines towit
Antinuclear Binding Antibody kits and all
of its components, toxoplasmosis kit and
all of its components, infectious mononucleosis kit and all of its components,
Herpes 1 and 2 kit and all of its components.
Neither of these statements by the trial court
provides sufficient information to enable appellant to
determine (1) what specific trade secrets were found by the
trial court;

(2) what types of employment would be considered

"competing" with respondent; (3) what geographic area was
contemplated by the trial court; and (4) the precise meaning
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of "all of its components".

A strict interpretation of the

final restraining order would seem to prevent appellant from
producing a test kit using any process, even though the
process utilized might be completely different than
respondent's claimed secret process.

A liberal reading of

the order would appear to prohibit appellant from being
employed as a microbiologist in any capacity if it would
involve the growth of cells, the use of slides or the
use of certain chemicals, all of which are components of
respondent's kits.
Without conceding that a restraining order is
justified at all in the instant case, appellant submits that
the order must at least be specific in defining the acts
which it seeks to prohibit.

If appellant is to be restrained

from utilizing the exact procedure used by respondent in
making a certain kit, the order should so state.

Certainly

an order preventing appellant from using skills and
techniques which he possessed prior to his emp.loyment with
respondent is unjustified.

Appellant further asserts that

an order prohibiting him from making test kits without what
this Court may find are, in fact, trade secrets, would be
unreasonable.

Appellant should not be placed in economic

bondage by an overly broad, vague restraining order.
Rule 65A(d} of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
sets forth clear guidelines for the form and scope of an
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injunction or restraining order:
Every order granting an injunction and every
restraining order shall be specific in terms;
shall describe in reasonable detail, and not
by reference to the complaint or other
document, the act or acts sought to be
restrained; and is binding only upon the
parties to the action, their officers, agents,
servants, employees, and attorneys, and upon
those persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of
the order by personal service or otherwise.
Appellant submits that the order entered by the
trial court does not comply with Rule 65A(d), U.R.C.P.

An

overly broad restraining order may be modified by an
appellate court.

E. W. Bliss Company v. Struthers-Dunn, Inc.,

408 F.2d 1108 (8th Cir. 1969).

It is further submitted that

where, as in the instant case the trial court apparently
has not determined what the trade secrets are, a modification
of the restraining order cannot be intelligently made.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Edward J. Mawod has been associated with
respondent since its creation.

He acted as its executive

director from 1974 until 1977 and was on the board of directors
for several years during the corporation's existence.

He knew

appellant personally and was put on notice of appellant's
intentions if Mr. Mawod became corporate president.

Mr.

Mawod, when he became president, had a fiduciary duty to
respondent which required him to act in respondent's best
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interest.
Despite these facts, Mr. Mawod, on behalf of the
respondent, executed the 1978 employment agreement which
contained no restrictions on appellant should he leave
respondent's employ.

Respondent preparted the agreement and

could have included any non-competition provisions it desired.
Instead, respondent elected to release appellant from any
previous restrictions and to not impose new non-competition
restraints.

A more clear, unambiguous or precise written

statement of respondent's intentions is inconceivable.
Mr. Mawod contends, however, that he did not know of
the 1968 agreement and that he did not discover it until
after appellant's employment was terminated.
is without merit for two reasons.

This contention

Mr. Mawod, as corporate

president, had all corporate files available to him and an
examination of the records would have revealed the 1968
agreement.

Not only did he fail to make such an examination,

he expressly, on behalf of respondent, revoked and cancelled
any and all prior agreements by the language used in the 1978
agreement.

The only logical conclusion is that this revocation

included all lost, stolen, burned, misplaced, forgotten or
destroyed written or oral agreements.
Prior to 1968 appellant put a substantial amount of
effort into developing a process whereby immunofluorescence
could be used to rapidly and accurately detect diseases in
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human beings.

He had successfully used this technique to

detect lupus erythematosus, a devastating disease affecting
primarily women during their child bearing years.

In 1966

he published a paper disclosing to the medical community how
to make and use this test.

The immunofluorescence technique

had proven useful in detecting Herpes virus and in 1967
and 1968 appellant began to work toward creating a test for
the earlier detection of cancer.
Mr. Mawod and the other promoters involved in
the establishment of the respondent corporation offered
appellant funding to continue this effort.

When the funding

did not materialize, appellant took what was and is common
knowledge in the tissue culture field, combined this with
his earlier immunofluorcscsnce work and employed the
University of Utah's Pyrex baking dish procedure to
commercially market test kits.
The uncontroverted testimony in this case clearly
shows that every procedure employed by respondent in
manufacturing its kits is in the public domain.

The Center

for Disease Control publishes the step by step procedure
for the toxoplasmosis kit, appellant has publicized the
ANA information which is equally applicable to the Herpes
kit and numerous competitors market kits which work as well
or better than respondent's.

The early detection of diseases

allows for more successful treatment and competition as well
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as the free exchange of information among medical supply
manufacturers and should be encouraged.
To overcome the foregoing facts respondent relies
on the testimony of two microbiologists.

Neither of these

scientists have any idea whatsoever how respondent's
competitors manufacture their kits and in fact, cannot say
that the competitors do not use the same equipment and
formulas as respondent.

Their testimony merely establishes

that they have never before observed certain techniques
and formulas which respondent uses.

Not only are they

unfamiliar with respondent's formulas, they have no idea
what effect the ingredients have on the product.

It is

submitted that this type of testimony is totally insufficient
to overcome the evidence that each and every method and
formula used by respondent is either in the public domain
or was used by appellant and numerous other scientists
long before respondent.

STE EN D. LUSTER

{lifs~JJi£L
Attorneys for Appellant
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APPENDIX "A:

... ~.,';;;/ ''J
EMPLOYMENT AGREEMEN'i·
• · '''.''"ER
· .. ·~" - . L.1;,,"
. :. -::·.:~··1. Utah

THIS AGREEMENT, made this

;i.~· ".!'/..

day of February, 1978,

between MICROBIOLOGICAL RESEARCH CORPORATION, a corporation,
herein called "Micro", and N. M. MUNA, Ph.D., herein called
"Muna",
WITNESSETH:
1.

All previous employment agreements and under-

standings in connection therewith are hereby mutually terminated
and settled.
2.

Commencing on the date first written above, Micro

employs Muna and Muna accepts such employment upon the terms and
conditions herein set forth.

3.

Muna agrees to act as a consultant and research

microbiologist for Micro upon such problems and projects as the
management of Micro shall specify, and shall be Dir. of Labs. (CDC)
4.
payable

Micro shall pay to Muna the sum of $17.00 per hour,

semi-mo~thly,

for such consulting and research work.

When not engaged in consulting work, Muna saall pursue the
designated research projects and shall devote as much time to
said employment as his health permits, but not to exceed 40 hours
per week, without prior written permission.
5.

Muna shall be entitled to vacations, sick-leave,

and medical insurance coverage as though he were a

full-~ime

employee.
6.

During the term of this agreement Muna shall not
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act as consultant for, or accept employment from any competitor
of Micro nor shall he compete directly or indirectly with Micro.

7.

Micro shall be the owner of all the research data,

ideas and material ,discovered or developed at Micro by Muna
-

I

during the term hereof. {,. .,,,,, .

8.

'2- i,

,,.\ ?'/ Jr].
111 J)~

This agreement shall continue in effect unless

terminated by thirty days advance written notice of either party.
MICROBIOLOGICAL RESEARCH CORPORATIO!

:M. MUNA, Ph.D.
MUNA
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APPENDIX "B"
(Appendix "B" has been reproducted on letter size paper instead
of its original legal size to correspond to the size of the
pages of this brief.)
MANAGEMENT CONTRACT

THIS AGREEMENT, made and entered into

this~

day of

September, 1968, by and between DR. NADEEM M. MUNA, hereinafter referred
to as

"Muna", and MICROBIOLOGICAL SCIENCES, INC., a Utah corporation,

hereinafter referred to as "Company";
WITNESSETH:
FOR AND IN CONSIDERATION of the mutual covenants herein contained, the parties hereto mutually agree as follows:
1.

The Company hereby employs Muna as its President and

General Manager for a period of five (5) years from the date hereof,
and thereafter, from year to year, unless terminated by either party
hereto by written notice at least sixty (60) days prior to any anniversary
date of this Agreement.
2.

During the term hereof, Muna agrees to and shall devote

his full time and efforts to the customary duties of a president and
8'!neral manager for the benefit of the Company.
3.

Any and all developments, processes, inventions, and/or

procedures developed, invented or processed by Muna during the term of
this agreement shall belong to and be the sole and absolute property
of the Compnny.
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4.

The Company shall pay Muna a basic salary of Twelve Thou~

Dollars ($12, 000. 00) per annum, payable in equal monthly installments,
for all services to be rendered by Muna for the Company.

i

The Company I
I

shall also reimburse Muna for all expenses incurred by him in

furtheran~

of the business of the Company, approved by the Board of Directors of

I

the Company.

!

I

S.

Muna agrees that the Company may, from time to time, applj

for and take out

~n

its own name and at its own expense life, health,

accident, or other insurance upon Muna that the Company may deem

neces~l

or advisable to protect its interests hereunder; and Muna agrees to
submit to any medical or other examination necessary for such purpose a
to assist and cooperate with the Company in procuring such insurance;
and Muna agrees that he shall have no right, title or interest in and
to such insurance.
6.

Muna agrees that during the terms of this Agreement he

will not engage in any other commercial activity in any way competitive
with the business of the Company, or its affiliated companies, and that,.

I

for a period of five (S) years after leaving the employ of the Company, i'
he will not engage in any way, directly or indirectly, in any business
competitive with the Company or its affiliated companies any any state
in which any of them do business.

Muna further agrees that he will not

disclose to any other person any information which is the property of
the Company or its affiliated companies.

7.

This Agreement shall cease and terminate if the Company

shall discontinue its business, and all rights and liabilities hereunder
shall cease.
Appendix
4
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B.

The Company shall have a right to assign this contract

to its successors or assigns and all covenants and agreements hereunder
shall inure to the benefit of and be enforceable by or against its said
successors or assigns.

The term "successor and assign" shall include

any corporation which buys all or substantially all of the Company's
assets, or all of its stock, or with which it merges or consolidates.
9.

Any waiver by either party of a breach of any provision

of this Agreement shall not operate as or be construed as a waiver of
any subsequent breach thereof.

10.

This Agreement shall be construed in accordance with the

laws of the State of Utah.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this Agreement is executed the day and year
first hereinabove written.

MICROBIOLOGICAL SCIENCES, INC.
ATTEST:

secreta'(j'

...,
Dr. Nadeem M. Muna
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